











The paper studies whether “idiosyncratic risk”, i.e. the degree to which firm and industry specific 
returns are more volatile than aggregate market returns, is higher in innovative industries which 
are characterized by more risk and uncertainty.  Volatility is studied both at the industry level (for 
34 different industries from 1974-2003) and at the firm level (for 5 industries with different levels of 
innovativeness: biotech, pharmaceuticals, computers, textile, agriculture).  Findings are mixed.  A 
relationship between innovation and volatility emerges most strongly with firm level data, when 
firm dimension is accounted for, and when time varying volatility is explicitly studied via GARCH 
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 I.  Introduction 
The paper studies whether idiosyncratic risk— the degree to which firm and industry specific 
returns are more volatile than aggregate market returns— is higher in innovative industries.  The 
central idea is that since innovation is a risky and uncertain process, and since asset pricing is a 
function of the stochastic discount factor which incorporates firm level risk, the behavior of returns 
of innovative firms should be different from that of non-innovative firms.    
By positing a relationship between changing patterns of innovation and changing patterns of 
firm and industry specific volatility, the study provides the foundations for an analysis of time-
varying risk premium which emphasizes real changes in production.  This lies in contrast with 
volatility studies which place emphasis on stochastic factors (e.g. herd effects and animal spirits in 
Shiller 1981) and/or on aggregate economic characteristics (e.g. aggregate consumption patterns 
in Campbell and Cochrane 1995).  The results provide new insights on the relationship between 
risk, innovation and volatility, of potential interest to both industrial economists and finance 
economists.    
The paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the literature on idiosyncratic risk and 
situates the present work within that body.  Section III reviews some stylized facts about what we 
know about inter-sectoral patterns of innovation and hypothesizes how these patterns might relate 
to different patterns of stock price volatility.  It also reviews results from a related study which finds 
that stock price “excess volatility” (Shiller, 1981) and “idiosyncratic risk” in specific industries 
(autos and computers) were highest during the decades in which innovation was most “radical” 
and “competence-destroying”.  Sections IV-VI evaluate volatility employing econometric tools (e.g. 
VAR, G/ARCH) on industry level data (Section V) and firm level data (Section VI) to see whether 
this result can be generalized, i.e. whether firms and industries with different levels of 
innovativeness have different patterns of idiosyncratic risk.  The methodology is similar to that 
used in Campbell et al. (2000).  Section VII uses panel estimation procedures to test this 
relationship more directly using firm level data on R&D intensity.  Section VIII summarizes the 
main results. 
II. Uncertainty and Idiosyncratic Risk  
“The starting point for any financial model is the uncertainty facing investors, and the 
substance of every financial model involves the impact of uncertainty on the behaviour of 
investors, and ultimately, on market prices.”  (Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay, 1997, p. 3) 
 
Modelling of uncertainty in finance models occurs through the analysis of the risk premia, i.e. 
the rewards that investors demand for bearing particular risks.  In the basic asset pricing equation 
below (Eq. 1) uncertainty is embodied in the variable M: 
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where Pit is the price of an asset i at time t (today); Et is the conditional expectations operator 
conditioning on today’s information i,t+1; Xi,t+1 is the random payoff on asset i at time t+1 
(tomorrow); and Mt+1 is the stochastic discount factor (SDF), i.e. a random variable whose 
realizations are always positive. The inclusion of uncertainty in asset pricing models occurs 
through the SDF.  If there is no uncertainty, then M is simply a constant that converts expected 
payoffs tomorrow into value today (Campbell 2000). This is the same as when investors are risk 
neutral. If instead uncertainty is high, then the mapping between expected payoffs into today’s 
value is more complex.   
Uncertainty in models of finance is principally about the variance of expected future profits 
and/or growth.  This can be caused by changes in consumer tastes, technology or institutions.  
Some models of uncertainty emphasize the variance of some aspect of the firm’s environment (e.g. 
GDP) and others emphasize the co-variances in the returns between investment projects
1.  The 
role of the co-variances is the focus of the Capital Asset Pricing Model which measures risk by the 
covariance of a firm's returns and the returns of the general market (e.g. S&P 500).  According to 
CAPM, there is a positive relationship between risk and the required rate of return on an 
investment.  Since asset returns capture, at least in theory, the effects of any aspect of a firm’s 
environment, uncertainty can be measured by the variance of firm level stock returns.   
Given the inability of the efficient market model (EMM) to reproduce the real volatility of stock 
returns with a constant discount rate (Shiller, 1981 and 2000, and for connections with IO literature 
see Mazzucato 2002), finance economists have for a long time been interested in modelling time 
varying risk premia, often making it a function of some exogenously changing macro variable.  For 
example, if it is assumed that the economy has a representative agent with a well-defined utility 
function, then the stochastic discount factor can be related to the marginal utility of aggregate 
consumption—calculated using time series of aggregate consumption (Campbell and Cochrane 
1995).  
While it is appropriate to use such aggregate series to understand aggregate volatility, the 
study of firm and industry specific risk requires understandings of risk and uncertainty at the level 
of the firm and industry.  Since innovation is one of the main sources of such uncertainty—through 
its disruptive effect on market structure and future growth potentials—finance studies could greatly 
benefit from analyses of how innovation behaviour differs across industries and across time.  The 
paper contributes to this objective by testing whether volatility of stock returns differ systematically 
                                                 
1 The effect of uncertainty on the incentive to invest depends on the assumption of the convexity or concavity 
of the marginal revenue product.   
 
  2in industries and periods in the industry life-cycle that are characterised by different innovation 
dynamics.  
Idiosyncratic risk measures the degree to which firm level volatility differs from aggregate 
market level volatility, where the latter is in most cases taken to be the S&P 500 index.  It is an 
element of price risk that can, in theory, be largely eliminated by diversification within an asset 
class
2. In factor models estimated by regression analysis, it is equal to the standard error. It is 
sometimes called security specific risk or unsystematic risk.  In a regression of a firm’s (or 
industry’s) return against the market level return, the beta in the CAPM model captures this 
idiosyncratic component: the higher is beta, the higher is the covariance between the two returns 
hence the lower is the idiosyncratic component of risk and the higher is the systematic component.   
Why do economists care about idiosyncratic risk?  Financial economists are interested in 
idiosyncratic risk for various reasons outlined in Campbell et al (2000): (1) the effect it has on 
aggregate volatility; (2) the information it provides to investors who want to diversify their portfolio; 
(3) the effect that it has on pricing errors; and (4) the effect it has on the price of options.  The 
current study adds a 5
th reason to this list: the study of idiosyncratic risk at the industry level and 
with a focus on its relation to innovation dynamics provides important insights on the time varying 
dimension of risk and how it is related not only to stochastic and exogenous factors but also to 
structural changes in production conditions.     
When analyzing the variance of stock returns it is important to distinguish the shocks to 
expected future cash flows, discounted at a constant rate, and shocks to the discount rates 
themselves.  Stock returns are driven by both, unless one believes that they are driven completely 
by bubble behavior, e.g. by herd behavior and fads.  Random walk models of stock prices imply 
that stock returns are driven completely by shocks to expected future cash flows.   
In this paper we do not enter the debate on whether stock prices follow a random walk or not 
(Mazzucato 2003).  We start from the presumption that innovation does indeed cause more 
uncertainty and shocks to expected future cash flows and study whether those firms and industries 
which are more innovative are in fact characterized by more idiosyncratic risk.  In doing so it 
provides insights on how empirical regularities about innovation, such as sectoral differences in 
innovation behavior (Pavitt 1984) and the evolution of innovation over the industry life-cycle 
(Klepper 1996), can provide insights on the time varying dynamics of idiosyncratic risk.   
                                                 
2 The more idiosyncratic risk there is the more assets must be included to achieve diversification.  
  3There are very few industry level studies of volatility.  The few that exist focus on the 
reallocation of resources across sectors. 
3 Motivated by this lacuna, Campbell et al. (2000) conduct 
a rigorous empirical study of idiosyncratic risk on firm level and industry level data.  Their aim is to 
test whether idiosyncratic risk has increased over time—due, for example, to the IT revolution and 
dynamics related to the New Economy.  They use high-frequency (daily) time series data on daily 
stock returns for the general market, industries and firms during the period 1963-1997. The 
approach is both descriptive and analytic. The chosen measure for volatility is the sample variance 
calculated on a monthly base.  While the industry level data is inconclusive, the firm level data 
confirms the hypothesis of increased idiosyncratic risk.  Specifically, their main findings are: 
1.  evidence of a positive deterministic time trend in stock return variances for individual 
firms, and no such evidence for market and industry return variances; 
2.  evidence of declining correlations among individual stock returns
4; 
3.  evidence that volatility moves counter-cyclically and tends to lead variations in GDP. 
 
In the conclusion of their study, Campbell et al offer various explanations of why idiosyncratic 
risk might have increased.  These are:  
a.  companies have begun to issue stock earlier in their life cycle when there is more 
uncertainty about future profits; 
b.  leverage effects;  
c.  improved information about future cash flows due to the IT revolution;  
d.  improved and quicker information via financial innovations (e.g. new derivative markets).  
The authors spend some time reviewing the mixed evidence on the empirical validity of these 
effects as well as their inconclusive causation.  For example, while improved information might 
increase the volatility of stock price level, it should (at least in the case of constant discount rates) 
decrease the volatility of stock returns since it allows news to arrive earlier when cash flows are 
more heavily discounted.   
 
In fact, the only explanation above whose effect is not ambiguous is the first one (a).  It is this 
effect—the life-cycle effect—that provides the motivation for the present paper.  Since innovation 
tends to be more radical during early industry evolution when there are more technological 
opportunities available, we test the hypothesis whether idiosyncratic risk is higher in new and/or 
                                                 
3 For example, Lilien (1982) studies how increases in industry level volatility of productivity growth reduce 
output as resources are diverted from production to costly reallocation across sectors, and Cabballero and 
Hammour (1994) study “cleansing recessions” with reallocation of resources at the  firm level.  Related are 
also models which test the firm-level relation between volatility and investment (Leahy and Whited, 1996).  
4 Evidence for (II) is found in the fact that the R sq. for the CAPM market model estimation have declined 
accordingly. 
 
  4high-tech industries (e.g. biotechnology).  Before reviewing the model, we first consider some 
reasons why innovation and stock price volatility might be related. 
 
III.  Innovation and Idiosyncratic Risk  
Both Frank Knight (1921)—an early pioneer of risk theory—and John Maynard Keynes 
distinguished risk from uncertainty.  They argued that while a risky event can be evaluated via 
probabilities based on priors (e.g. a lottery), an uncertain event cannot be since a truly uncertain 
situation is “unique” 
5.  Both economists used technological innovation as an example of true 
uncertainty.    
Innovation is an uncertain process both from the point of view of the process by which it 
comes about and its outcome.  Reasons for this include: (1) knowledge evolves in a tacit non-
codifiable manner, embodied in firm-specific capabilities and competencies (Nelson and Winter, 
1982); (2) innovation is an outcome of the complex interaction between firm-specific capabilities 
and institution like scientific institutions (Nelson 1993);  (3) innovations cause changes to the status 
quo, rendering knowledge in the current period not a good predictor of knowledge in the next 
period (Cohen and Levinthal 1989); (4) the fact that innovators might be incumbents (as is often 
the case for incremental innovations) or a new entrants (as is often the case for radical 
innovations) means that the effect on market structure is uncertain; and (5) investment in the 
innovation process does not always lead to an actual innovation (as is evidenced by recent data on 
the pharmaceutical industry).    
The relationship between innovation and stock prices is determined by the effect of these 
types of uncertainty on stock prices.  Innovation often (not always) causes a shake-up of market 
shares, diminishing the power of the incumbents who have an invested interest in the status quo.  
In this situation, current performance is not a good indicator of future performance.  Hence, it is 
especially in such unstable periods that investors will be more likely to be influenced by the 
speculation of other investors, leading to herd effects and the type of over-reactions emphasized 
by Campbell and Shiller (1981) in their analysis of excess volatility.     
There are not many studies which link stock price dynamics to innovation. Jovanovic and 
MacDonald (1994) make predictions concerning the evolution of the average industry stock price 
around the “shakeout” period of the industry life-cycle.  Focusing on the US tire industry, they build 
a model which assumes that an industry is born as a result of a basic invention and that the 
                                                 
5  “The practical difference between the two categories, risk and uncertainty, is that in the former the 
distribution of the outcome in a group of instances is known (either from calculation a priori or from statistics 
of past experience). While in the case of uncertainty that is not true, the reason being in general that it is 
impossible to form a group of instances, because the situation dealt with is in a high degree unique…” 
(Knight, 1921, p. 232-233)     
  5shakeout occurs as a result of one major refinement to that invention.
6  They predict that just 
before the shakeout occurs the average stock price will fall because the new innovation 
precipitates a fall in product price which is bad news for incumbents.  
Jovanovic and Greenwood (1999) also link stock prices to innovation by developing a model 
in which innovation causes new capital to destroy old capital (with a lag). Since it is primarily 
incumbents who are initially quoted on the stock market, innovations cause the stock market to 
decline immediately since rational investors with perfect foresight foresee the future damage to old 
capital.  Hence the authors claim that the drop in market value of IT firms in the 1970’s was due to 
the upcoming IT revolution (in the 1990’s).  
Although both these papers connect innovation to the evolution of stock prices, they focus on 
the level of stock prices not on the volatility of stock prices
7.  One well known study that links stock 
price volatility to innovation is Shiller (2000), where it is shown that ‘excess volatility’, the degree to 
which stock prices are more volatile than the present value of discounted future dividends (i.e. the 
underlying fundamentals that they are supposed to be tracking according to the efficient market 
model), peaks precisely during the second and third industrial revolutions.  However, the link 
between volatility and uncertainty is better studied at the level of the firm since this allows it to be 
related to the firm’s environment.  The fact that most shocks are idiosyncratic to the firm or plant 
makes this imperative (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992) 
Mazzucato and Semmler (1999) and Mazzucato (2002) extend Shiller’s work to the industry 
level by studying the relationship between innovation and stock price volatility in two specific 
industries: autos and PCs.  They find that both idiosyncratic risk and excess volatility were highest 
precisely during the periods in which innovation in these industries was the most radical (using 
quality change data in Filson 2001)
8.  This was also the period in which market shares were most 
unstable—due to the “destruction” of incumbents’ advantages after “creative” innovations.   
                                                 
6 They admit that this is a strong assumption but motivate it through the fact that a single shakeout is typical 
in the Gort and Klepper (1982) data and that particularly in the US tire industry there seems to have been 
one major invention, the Banbury mixer in 1916, which caused the shakeout to occur (Jovanovic and 
MacDonald, 1994, p. 324-325).  
 
7 The relation between the level of a firms’ stock price and stock price volatility has also been studied via the 
“leverage effect”: a firm’s stock price decline raises the firm’s financial leverage, resulting in an increase in 
the volatility of equity (Black, 1976; Christie, 1982).  The relation is also captured by studies of time-varying 
risk premia which argue that a forecasted increase in return volatility results in an increase in required 
expected future stock returns and thus an immediate stock price decline (Pindyk, 1984 and others reviewed 
in Duffie, 1995) 
8 In Mazzucato and Semmler (1999) and Mazzucato (2002), “excess volatility” is measured as in Shiller 
(1981), i.e. the difference between the standard deviation of actual stock prices (vt below) and efficient 
market prices (v*t):      and      where  is the ex-post rational or perfect-
*















  6In this paper we ask whether these results can be generalized to different industries.  To 
posit a (hypothetical) mapping between sectoral stock price dynamics and sectoral innovation 
dynamics we make use of the literature on sectoral taxonomies of innovation (Pavitt 1984, Marsili 
2001) and the literature on the industry life-cycle (Gort and Klepper 1982; Klepper 1996).  These 
works provide insights into how innovation processes and outcomes differ between 
industries/sectors and between different periods in industry evolution
9.    
IV.  Methodology 
Like Campbell et al. (2000) we study idiosyncratic risk across different firms and industries.  
In particular, we study the aggregate behavior of 34 industries and, at the firm level, the evolution 
of 5 particular industries.  Our aim is test whether the more innovative industries are characterized 
by more excess volatility and idiosyncratic risk.   We first study quarterly data on industry level 
stock returns for the period 1976-1997.  Later, the analysis is extended to the firm level, employing 
monthly data for the period 1981-2003 on 34 firms belonging to 5 industries with different levels of 
innovativeness (biotechnologies, computers, pharmaceuticals, textiles and agriculture). 
The 34 industries included in the industry level analysis are listed in Table 1 below.  The 5 
different industries for which monthly firm level data is analyzed between 1981 and 2003 are:  
1. Biotechnology (very innovative) 
2. Pharmaceutical (innovative) 
3. Computers (innovative) 
4. Textile (low innovative)  
5. Agricultural (low innovative) 
 
Using R&D intensity data, we have divided these industries into ‘very innovative’, ‘innovative’ 
and ‘low innovative’. This classification is confirmed by the sectoral taxonomy of innovation 
found in the (Marsili, 2001).  The industry level data comes from Standard and Poor’s 
                                                                                                                                                                  
k t D + j t+ foresight price,  is the dividend stream, γ is a real discount factor equal to 1 , and  is the 
short (one-period) rate of discount at time t+j. 
) 1 /( j t r + + j t r +
9  Pavitt’s (1984) sectoral taxonomy of innovation categorizes sectors by the way that innovation is introduced 
(e.g. via suppliers, via scale, via science), by the type of innovating firms (large, small), and by the type of 
innovation (product vs. process).  Gort and Klepper (1982) and Klepper (1996) emphasize how innovation 
dynamics change during the course of industry evolution: innovation during the early stage tends to be more 
product oriented and radical, while innovation in the mature phase is more process oriented, incremental and 
led by large firms.  Other authors have divided sectors and/or periods of sectoral evolution into Schumpeter 
Mark I and II, where Mark I (II) represents industries with high (low) entry, less (more) persistence in firms’ 
ability to innovate, and a more codifiable (tacit) knowledge base (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1996).  For 
example, chemicals falls more into Mark II while mechanical engineering falls more into Mark I.  Likewise, the 
early auto industry falls more into Mark I while the mature phase of autos falls more into Mark II.  
 
  7Analysts Handbooks while the firm level data comes from Standard and Poor’s Compustat 
database.   
 
As stated above, we are interested in linking differences in volatility and hypothesized 
differences in innovation.  In line with other studies of idiosyncratic risk (Campbell et al. 
2000), the volatility of firm and industry returns is compared with market returns (S&P 500 
index).  For both the industry level and firm level data, we analyze volatility using the 
following methods: basic descriptive statistics of the standard deviations; deterministic and 
stochastic trend analysis of volatility; Granger causality analysis to see whether the general 
market returns have predictive capabilities for the innovative industries and firms; variance 
decomposition analysis to study the relative contributions of unit-specific and unspecific 
variances to the single units volatilities; and regression analysis with the CAPM model to 
evaluate the degree to which the average market return explains the industry and firm level 
returns.   
The higher frequency of the data in the firm-level analysis (monthly instead of quarterly) 
allows us to use GARCH methods to study time varying volatility.   GARCH analysis allows a 
direct consideration of time varying volatility through the use of the ARCH/GARCH modeling 
strategy.  Under the ARCH/GARCH model perspective, the variance of the series is directly 
modeled and the responsiveness to idiosyncratic shocks is evaluated by confronting the 
dimensions of the AR and MA terms in the variance equation.   
V. Industry level results  
This section contains the empirical evaluation of industry level stock returns. The 
approach adopted here is both descriptive and econometric. We briefly present the method, 
the expected results and the outcomes of the analysis.  
V.a. Descriptive statistics  
The descriptive analysis looks at the distributions of the different industry level time 
series. Information is given on specific max/min values and correlations between general 
market (SP500) returns and industry level rates of returns. We expect variability in the 
innovative industries to be higher than average and correlations between industry-level and 
market returns to be higher for the more traditional, less innovative industries.  Table 1 





  8Table 1 
Industry level stock return, descriptive statistics 
Industry  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. Industry  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.
TRANSPORT 0.1007 3.4089 -0.2685 0.3831 FOREST PROD. PUBL. 0.0690 0.3300 -0.2166 0.1074
SEMICONDUCTORS 0.0768 1.6463 -0.6776 0.2619 HOSPITAL SUPPLIES 0.0529 0.2607 -0.1699 0.1064
NAT. GAS PIPELINES 0.0798 0.9588 -0.3777 0.1502 INSURANCE MULTIL. 0.0669 0.2992 -0.2170 0.1053
BUILD. MATERIALS 0.0674 0.4662 -0.2613 0.1367 FINANCIAL 0.0705 0.3073 -0.2450 0.1041
ELECTRONIC INSTR. 0.0480 0.5427 -0.2612 0.1367 FOOD CHAINS RETAIL 0.0724 0.3119 -0.1619 0.1014
AUTOMOBILES 0.0782 0.4403 -0.2328 0.1331 INSURANCE PROPERTY 0.0752 0.2985 -0.1443 0.1012
TRUCKER TRANSP. 0.0416 0.3759 -0.2406 0.1275 FOREST PROD. PAPER 0.0599 0.3327 -0.1864 0.1001
BANKS NY 0.0816 0.3975 -0.2884 0.1251 CHEMICALS AND COAL 0.0684 0.3070 -0.1955 0.0992
DEPT. STORE RETAIL 0.0666 0.4930 -0.3635 0.1250 INTEGR. DOMESTICS 0.0678 0.3539 -0.2083 0.0950
AEROSP. DEFENCE 0.0736 0.5037 -0.3964 0.1246 METAL AND GLASS CONF. 0.0676 0.2514 -0.2093 0.0946
PAPER CONFECT 0.0646 0.4118 -0.2364 0.1210 BREWERS AND ALCOOL 0.0573 0.2766 -0.1325 0.0940
ENTERTAINMENT 0.0584 0.3630 -0.2835 0.1196 SOFT DRINKS NON ALC. 0.0758 0.2685 -0.1836 0.0926
ALLUMINIUM 0.0593 0.4188 -0.2328 0.1193 ELECRICAL EQUIPMENT 0.0643 0.2536 -0.2529 0.0870
TOBACCO 0.0930 0.3754 -0.2496 0.1177 COMPOSIT OIL 0.0790 0.2893 -0.1575 0.0800
RETAIL COMP. 0.0523 0.2879 -0.3449 0.1145 ELECTRIC POWER COMP. 0.0992 0.3333 -0.0794 0.0740
PUBLISHING NEWSP. 0.0629 0.4078 -0.2308 0.1128 SP500 0.0657 0.2390 -0.2049 0.0713
RESTAURANTS 0.0525 0.2843 -0.2503 0.1081 PUBLIC UTILITIES 0.0930 0.2724 -0.0650 0.0684
 
Evidence in favor of the expected results is found only for transports, semi-conductors 
and, to a minor extent, for electronic instruments.  More traditional but innovative industries 
signaling high variability are automobiles and other vehicles industries.  The natural gas 
pipelines and building materials industries, even if not strictly innovative according to the 
tables in the appendix, show high sample means and variability. At the bottom, low variability 
and levels are signaled for more traditional and low innovative industries such as public 
utilities, electric power companies, oil, electrical equipment, food chains and beverage 
(alcoholic and non alcoholic) industries. Hence, the evidence from the descriptive analysis is 
rather mixed.  Expectations appear satisfied only at the very extremes of the taxonomy.  
In the attempt to achieve more clear-cut conclusions, we conduct variance tests of 
equality. We expect to obtain a figure of global heterogeneity particularly in the volatility 
measures, with stronger results for the innovative industries. Persistent rejections of the pair 
wise variance equality hypothesis are expected when the reference term is the general 
market stock returns series. The equality tests employed are the ones from Bartlett, Levene 
and Brown-Forsythe.  
The evidence of global heterogeneity results strongly, independently of the test statistic 
employed. Also, different variance equality tests
10 between couples of series strongly reject 
the null hypothesis of homogeneity in all the high and mid innovative industries except the 
transport sector, for which a surprising (but weak) equivalence in variability appears 
established under the Levene (1960) and Brown-Forsythe (1974) formulations of the test. 
  9The variance equality hypothesis is strongly accepted only for public utilities, electric power 
companies, the electric equipment and the oil sectors, all belonging to a low innovative-
cluster. 
Correlation analysis only partially corroborates our expectations, at least for the 
innovative industries. The smallest correlation with the S&P500 behavior is correctly signaled 
by the transport and semi-conductor industries (respectively 0.07 and 0.19), the others being 
all above the value of 0.25. The higher correlations are obtained, in line with the 
expectations, (but not strictly with the previous results) for chemicals and coal, paper and 
forest products, publishing, electrical and financial industries, all traditional, low-innovative 
industries and all above the value of 0.75. 
The behavior of standard deviations (SD) over time, calculated as four terms (quarterly) 
moving averages of yearly SD, provides some general insight of the supposed excess 
volatility in innovative industries. Figs. 1-2 below show the SD dynamics for two particularly 
innovative industries: semiconductors and electrical instruments.  Interestingly, in both cases, 
the periods of greatest volatility as compared to the S&P 500, are precisely in the periods 
which the case study literature on those industries identify as being particularly innovative 
periods (see Malerba 1985 for semiconductors, and Bresnahan 1998 for electrical 
instruments). That is, the mid 1980’s for semiconductors and the 1990s for electrical 
instruments.  
Fgure 1 













                                                                                                                                                                  
10 The different formulations employed for the tests of equality of variances are the standard F-test, the 
Siegel-Tukey with continuity correction (Sheskin, 1997), the adjusted Bartlett statistic (Judge et al. 1985), the 
Levene test (1960) and the Brown-Forsythe (1974) test.  
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V.b. Descriptive statistics during different periods 
Given the added insight provided by the moving averages above, we look more into the 
time dimension of volatility by looking separately at different time periods for each of the 
industries.  The three sub-periods chosen are 1976-1983, 1983-1990, 1990-1997.  Table 2 
illustrates the changes in ranking between industries by most volatile to least volatile during 
the three different periods.  We see that each period has a different ranking, although 
semiconductors appears first in both the second and third periods (and first in the first 
period).  Almost all the industries are more volatile than the composite S&P500 index in each 
of the three periods, with the S&P500 coming out least volatile in the third period.  This last 
result would in fact make it appear that idiosyncratic risk at the level of the industry did in fact 
increase over time as is maintained in Campbell et al. (2000).  However, as with the previous 
tests, the results seem quite mixed and make most sense for the industries in the extreme of 
the categorization (e.g. semiconductors, transports and electrical instruments). We come 
back to this result in section VII where we study changes in volatility using a panel data 








  11Table 2 
Changes in rank by standard deviation 
1976-1983 1983-1990 1990-1997
TRANSPORT 0.555272 SEMI_CONDUCTORS__ELECTRI 1.331324 SEMI_CONDUCTORS__ELECTRI 3.109713
TRUCKER__TRANSPORT_01 0.074598 DEPT_STORE__RETAIL_01 0.073531 SOFT_DRINKS_AND_NON_ALCH 1.57723
SEMI_CONDUCTORS__ELECTRI 0.059955 BANKS__NY__AMP01 0.072827 NATURAL_GAS_PIPELINES01 0.161014
AUTOMOBILES 0.058785 AEROSPACE_AND_DEFENCE01 0.07177 ELECTRONIC_INSTRUMENTS__ 0.106181
AEROSPACE_AND_DEFENCE01 0.055963 BUILDING_MATERIALS01 0.071655 TOBACCO 0.080668
BUILDING_MATERIALS01 0.053241 ENTERTAINMENT__ENTERT_AN 0.066644 AUTOMOBILES 0.077009
ELECTRONIC_INSTRUMENTS__ 0.05323 PAPER__CONFECTIONERY_01 0.054377 TRUCKER__TRANSPORT_01 0.0722
PUBLISHING__NEWSPAPERS_0 0.050872 AUTOMOBILES 0.054216 BUILDING_MATERIALS01 0.070122
NATURAL_GAS_PIPELINES01 0.047128 TOBACCO 0.051932 PAPER__CONFECTIONERY_01 0.06755
ALLUMINIUM 0.045563 RETAIL_COMPOSITE01 0.044611 HOSPITAL_SUPPLIES01 0.065696
RESTAURANTS 0.041225 FINANCIAL 0.042419 ALLUMINIUM 0.058074
DEPT_STORE__RETAIL_01 0.040345 ALLUMINIUM 0.039866 INSURANCE__MULTILINE_01 0.05075
INTEGRATED_DOMESTIC01 0.038554 PUBLISHING__FOREST_PRODU 0.038194 RETAIL_COMPOSITE01 0.049765
CHEMICALS__CHEM_AND_COAL 0.037234 PUBLISHING__NEWSPAPERS_0 0.036728 METAL_AND_GLASS__CONFECT 0.049673
PUBLISHING__FOREST_PRODU 0.036225 RESTAURANTS 0.035519 BANKS__NY__AMP01 0.042466
ENTERTAINMENT__ENTERT_AN 0.035521 INSURANCE__MULTILINE_01 0.034177 DEPT_STORE__RETAIL_01 0.038836
PAPER__FOREST_PRODUCT_01 0.034622 TRUCKER__TRANSPORT_01 0.032235 FOOD_CHAINS__RETAIL_01 0.038654
RETAIL_COMPOSITE01 0.033912 HOSPITAL_SUPPLIES01 0.02607 INSURANCE__PROPERTY_01 0.03648
INSURANCE__PROPERTY_01 0.032948 CHEMICALS__CHEM_AND_COAL 0.025641 PAPER__FOREST_PRODUCT_01 0.032258
BANKS__NY__AMP01 0.032902 TRANSPORT 0.025231 FINANCIAL 0.031021
BREWERS_AND_ALCOOLICS__B 0.027502 SOFT_DRINKS_AND_NON_ALCH 0.024981 RESTAURANTS 0.029783
FOOD_CHAINS__RETAIL_01 0.02629 ELECTRONIC_INSTRUMENTS__ 0.024191 ENTERTAINMENT__ENTERT_AN 0.029018
PAPER__CONFECTIONERY_01 0.026214 FOOD_CHAINS__RETAIL_01 0.023654 PUBLISHING__NEWSPAPERS_0 0.027596
INSURANCE__MULTILINE_01 0.021646 BREWERS_AND_ALCOOLICS__B 0.023278 INTEGRATED_DOMESTIC01 0.021308
COMPOSITE_OIL__OIL1_01 0.020669 PAPER__FOREST_PRODUCT_01 0.021616 ELECTR_POWER_COMP__UTILI 0.020884
METAL_AND_GLASS__CONFECT 0.019989 INSURANCE__PROPERTY_01 0.019874 ELECTRICAL_EQUIPMENT__EL 0.02033
FINANCIAL 0.019298 ELECTRICAL_EQUIPMENT__EL 0.01987 TRANSPORT 0.018335
HOSPITAL_SUPPLIES01 0.018166 INTEGRATED_DOMESTIC01 0.008686 PUBLISHING__FOREST_PRODU 0.018006
ELECTRICAL_EQUIPMENT__EL 0.013383 NATURAL_GAS_PIPELINES01 0.008037 CHEMICALS__CHEM_AND_COAL 0.015391
SP500 0 METAL_AND_GLASS__CONFECT 0.004168 PUBLIC_UTILITIES01 0.014353
TOBACCO -0.000437 SP500 0 AEROSPACE_AND_DEFENCE01 0.012317
ELECTR_POWER_COMP__UTILI -0.001617 COMPOSITE_OIL__OIL1_01 -0.005905 BREWERS_AND_ALCOOLICS__B 0.009579
SOFT_DRINKS_AND_NON_ALCH -0.003019 ELECTR_POWER_COMP__UTILI -0.011679 COMPOSITE_OIL__OIL1_01 0.00848
PUBLIC_UTILITIES01 -0.012124 PUBLIC_UTILITIES01 -0.012265 SP500 0 
V.c. Trend analysis 
Campbell et al. (2000) find some evidence of a (positive) trend in the individual firms 
stock returns variances.  In order to check if this is the case for the industry level data (in 
particular for the innovative industries), we employ a battery of DF-ADF tests on the industry 
level time varying SDs. All SDs are stationary except for the natural gas pipelines and the 
transport industries, and the presence of a deterministic trend is always rejected except for 
brewer and alcoholics, publishing, restaurants, trucker (transports), all low innovative 
industries, presenting statistically meaningful, but negative, trends. The presence of a unit 
root for the two “mature” industries, hence of nonstationarity in mean and variance, is due to 
the presence of two structural breaks in the series located, respectively in 1995 and 1982. 
The breaks in the SD series are potentially due to outliers, since the shocks appear to be 
quite local. When a dummy was introduced, and when the Perron-Ng (1996) test was 
employed, both the series resulted stationary, and no deterministic trend emerged.  This 
evidence is consistent with the hypothesis of an almost stable variability over time at the 
industry level (Campbell et al. 2000).  Akin to the results in Campbell et al. (2000), the 
trending hypothesis, conditional to the strategy adopted, is not confirmed at the industry 
level.  
  12Table 3   
DF ADF tests on industry stock returns* 
stat prob coeff t-stat prob
Aerospace and defence -4.137 0.008 -0.0004 -1.591 0.116
Alluminium -3.929 0.015 -0.0001 -0.582 0.562
Automobiles -3.215 0.089 -0.0001 -0.642 0.523
Banks (NY) amp -4.021 0.012 -0.0001 -0.483 0.630
Brewers and alcoolics (bev) -3.594 0.037 -0.0003 -2.123 0.037
Building materials -4.324 0.005 0.0000 -0.231 0.818
Chemicals (chem and coal) -3.768 0.023 -0.0002 -1.416 0.161
Composite oil (oil1) -3.464 0.050 -0.0002 -1.587 0.117
Dept store (retail) -3.963 0.014 -0.0001 -0.452 0.653
Electronic instruments (electronics) -4.180 0.007 0.0000 -0.316 0.753
Electrical equipment (electrical) -3.797 0.022 -0.0001 -0.779 0.438
Electr Power comp (utilities1) -3.179 0.096 0.0001 0.333 0.740
Entertainment (entert and fert) -3.661 0.031 -0.0002 -1.016 0.313
Financial -3.924 0.015 -0.0001 -0.837 0.405
Food chains (retail) -3.353 0.065 -0.0001 -0.756 0.452
Hospital supplies -4.156 0.008 0.0001 0.544 0.588
Insurance (property) -3.685 0.029 0.0000 -0.296 0.768
Integrated domestic -3.926 0.015 -0.0002 -1.391 0.168
Metal and glass (confectionery) -3.374 0.062 -0.0001 -1.129 0.262
Insurance (multiline) -4.820 0.001 0.0001 0.543 0.589
Natural gas pipelines -2.038 0.571 0.0003 1.202 0.234
Paper (confectionery) -4.226 0.006 0.0000 0.130 0.897
Paper (forest product) -4.138 0.008 -0.0001 -0.794 0.430
Public utilities -4.789 0.001 0.0000 0.118 0.907
Publishing (forest products) -3.909 0.016 -0.0003 -1.878 0.064
Publishing (newspapers) -4.540 0.002 -0.0004 -2.190 0.032
Restaurants -4.404 0.004 -0.0002 -1.529 0.131
Retail composite -3.174 0.097 -0.0001 -0.366 0.715
Semi conductors (electrical) -3.624 0.034 0.0004 0.778 0.439
Soft drinks and non alchoolics -3.276 0.078 0.0000 0.322 0.748
Tobacco -3.235 0.085 0.0002 1.338 0.185
Transport -2.901 0.168 -0.0015 -1.271 0.208
trucker (transport) -5.552 0.000 -0.0004 -2.109 0.038
SP500 -3.741 0.025 -0.0001 -1.150 0.254
DF/ADF trend
 
*The lag order is chosen according to the Schwartz Bayesian Criterion (SBC).  
V.d. VAR representation: Granger Causality and Variance Decomposition analysis 
In order to analyze the dynamic relationships between the general market and the 
industry specific stock returns, a bi-variate Vector Autoregressive (VAR) representation 
between couples—SP500 and industry returns— is established and estimated. The lag order 
p is defined according to the indications of the commonly used information criteria, such as 
SBC and AIC. The VARs are then employed as the basic structure for testing the Granger 
non causality hypothesis and for implementing variance decomposition exercises.  
It is important to emphasize that the causality approach is not fully legitimate, given the 
perspective assumed here. In fact, the absence of Granger causality is not by itself a 
corroboration of our hypotheses. First, because industry specificities may exist independently 
from the existence of particular dynamic relationships between the series. Second, because 
quarterly observations are not the ideal reference time interval on which to base conclusive 
  13considerations on financial interrelations. Our hypothesis is that if idiosyncratic risk affects 
the volatility of stock returns (hence the dispersion around the estimated dynamic coefficients 
of the UVAR), then we expect the general market dynamics not to be a valid predictor for 
them.  We expect, in fact, the general market returns to have no predictive capabilities (i.e. 
are not Granger causal) for the innovative industries’ stock returns.  
From variance decomposition we further expect to find a lower percentage contribution 
of S&P 500 variance in forecast variances decompositions of the more innovative industries’ 
returns, in other terms, a bigger presence of the industry specific variance.  Even under this 
perspective, the results are not very clear.  Evidence of no Granger causality is found both 
for some of the innovative industries (transports, semiconductors, electronic instruments) as 
well as for some of the low innovative industries. Hence, Granger non causality is not an 
exclusive attribute of the innovative industries. Even assuming an opposite perspective, i.e. 
expecting Granger causality between SP500 and lower innovative industries, the results are 
still inconclusive.  
From variance decomposition analysis expectations are decisively satisfied, again, only 
for semiconductors and transports, but some favorable evidence emerges also for other 
industries deemed to be quite innovative (automobiles, integrated domestics) according to 
the tables in the appendix.  For the two industries mentioned above, the forecast variance at 
a 1 quarter horizon appears dominated almost entirely by idiosyncratic variability, on average 
explaining, respectively, about 96% and 99% of the total variability. The values at a 10 
quarters horizon are still high, respectively 95% and 94%. The evidence remains mixed for 
all the other industries partially following the behavior emerging from the descriptive analysis 
presented in table 1. Table 4 below contains the results from forecast error variance 
decomposition for the bivariate VARs including the industry specific rate of return and the 
SP500 rate of return. The values reported are for the autonomous (thus idiosyncratic) 
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Forecast error variance decomposition for the industry level rates of return 
Industry 1234 Industry 1234
TRANSPORT 99.620 98.563 94.666 94.612 FOREST PROD. PUBL. 39.733 39.733 39.733 39.733
SEMICONDUCTORS 95.674 95.143 95.137 95.136 HOSPITAL SUPPLIES 47.143 47.143 47.143 47.143
NAT. GAS PIPELINES 85.250 85.250 85.250 85.250 INSURANCE MULTIL. 46.971 46.971 46.971 46.971
BUILD. MATERIALS 46.919 46.919 46.919 46.919 FINANCIAL 27.704 27.773 26.496 26.988
ELECTRONIC INSTR. 54.911 54.526 53.744 53.502 FOOD CHAINS RETAIL 60.073 59.912 59.821 59.275
AUTOMOBILES 69.496 69.693 68.836 67.975 INSURANCE PROPERTY 51.890 51.890 51.890 51.890
TRUCKER TRANSP. 61.469 61.469 61.469 61.469 FOREST PROD. PAPER 40.693 44.092 44.253 44.261
BANKS NY 51.069 51.069 51.069 51.069 CHEMICALS AND COAL 39.986 39.986 39.986 39.986
DEPT. STORE RETAIL 52.870 53.781 54.415 54.477 INTEGR. DOMESTICS 74.996 75.054 74.978 75.032
AEROSP. DEFENCE 56.058 56.440 56.443 49.873 METAL AND GLASS CONF. 58.784 58.580 60.014 60.954
PAPER CONFECT 55.474 55.474 55.474 55.474 BREWERS AND ALCOOL 59.072 59.072 59.072 59.072
ENTERTAINMENT 59.428 59.428 59.428 59.428 SOFT DRINKS NON ALC. 51.987 51.987 51.987 51.987
ALLUMINIUM 69.752 64.744 64.653 64.634 ELECRICAL EQUIPMENT 32.259 34.260 35.112 35.178
TOBACCO 63.237 63.237 63.237 63.237 COMPOSIT OIL 66.749 66.747 66.945 66.944
RETAIL COMP. 58.085 58.085 58.085 58.085 ELECTRIC POWER COMP. 75.948 75.948 75.948 75.948
PUBLISHING NEWSP. 40.097 40.097 40.097 40.097 SP500
RESTAURANTS 48.892 48.892 48.892 48.892 PUBLIC UTILITIES 58.466 58.466 58.466 58.466
Note: Industries are presented according to the variability ordering of table 1
Note: The forecast error decomposition for the SP500 contribution on the industry level variance is the complement to 100 of the autonomous contribution
Forecast period  Forecast period 
 
V.e.  CAPM system estimation of betas   
We now estimate the CAPM structural parameters in order to obtain both a test of the 
efficient market hypothesis and, particularly, a measure of the heterogeneity in alphas, betas 
and excess returns.  Equation 2 below is estimated by employing both single equations 
methods (OLS) and simultaneous system estimation methods (FGLS, SURE, iterative 
SURE).  
it mt mi it R R ε β + =         ( 2 )  
it R = avg. rate of return for industry i:  1 , / ) ( − + t i it it P D P  
mt R =avg. market rate of return (S&P 500 index) 
mi β = beta for industry i with respect to market return 
it ε =    industry specific residual 
Under the non-diagonal variance-covariance errors matrix (i.e. cross dependencies 
between equations of the system), a simultaneous estimation is needed and also resolves 
more efficiently. Furthermore, it allows for a straightforward implementation of a testing 
  15strategy (Wald) for the evaluation of the heterogeneity in parameters, with particular 
reference to the betasn general, for the cross equations assumptions on the estimated 
parameters. We thus expect the betas for the innovative industries to be different from unity 
or statistically meaningless.  The finding of betas inequality is a signal of global 
heterogeneity, possibly related to idiosyncratic factors that are inconsistent with the EMM 
hypothesis.  Furthermore, in line with the results obtained by Campbell et al. (2000), we 
expect to find a decreased Rbar sq. statistic for the equations relative to the innovative 
sectors.   
Results are substantially identical under the different methodologies employed and 
appears in line with those obtained with the other empirical approaches. The variance 
explained by the regressions is in fact approximately zero for semiconductors and transports, 
and almost irrelevant for the natural gas pipelines industry.  The maximum values are 
obtained by the publishing industry, the paper and forest products, the electrical equipment 
industry, the chemical and coal industries and the financial industry.  
From the coefficients test analysis we obtain that, for most of the considered sectors, 
the hypothesis of unit beta value cannot be rejected except for semiconductors and 
transport, where downsized, meaningless betas are obtained.  In any case, the global 
heterogeneity hypothesis is confirmed by the Wald test of equality of beta parameters 
(equality is strictly rejected). The same hypothesis is instead accepted if the industries at the 
extremes of the taxonomy are excluded from the equality assumption. Thus, distinctive 
behaviors for different rankings of the innovative industries emerges only for some of the 
high and low innovative industries considered in the analysis. Table 5 below presents the 
results of the industry level SURE estimation of the CAPM formulation, reporting (for sake of 
simplicity) only the R bar sq. and the betas statistics .               
 
Table 5 
CAPM industry level betas estimation 
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Industry Beta coeff Std. Error t-Statistic Adj R-sq Industry Beta coeff Std. Error t-Statistic Adj R-sq
TRANSPORT 0.4051 0.5705 0.7101 -0.0061 FOREST PROD. PUBL. 1.1522 0.1014 11.3678 0.5979
SEMICONDUCTORS 0.6998 0.3852 1.8169 0.0262 HOSPITAL SUPPLIES 1.0814 0.1105 9.7861 0.5229
NAT. GAS PIPELINES 0.8049 0.2058 3.9108 0.1372 INSURANCE MULTIL. 1.0801 0.1099 9.8292 0.5246
BUILD. MATERIALS 1.3756 0.1403 9.8019 0.5252 FINANCIAL 1.2229 0.0843 14.4997 0.7087
ELECTRONIC INSTR. 1.2247 0.1566 7.8211 0.4118 FOOD CHAINS RETAIL 0.9097 0.1157 7.8640 0.4143
AUTOMOBILES 0.9740 0.1694 5.7486 0.2716 INSURANCE PROPERTY 0.9683 0.1090 8.8809 0.4749
TRUCKER TRANSP. 1.1188 0.1532 7.3019 0.3779 FOREST PROD. PAPER 1.0680 0.0953 11.2070 0.5864
BANKS NY 1.2106 0.1342 9.0190 0.4832 CHEMICALS AND COAL 1.0623 0.0931 11.4123 0.5953
DEPT. STORE RETAIL 1.1886 0.1368 8.6884 0.4643 INTEGR. DOMESTICS 0.6531 0.1247 5.2384 0.2325
AEROSP. DEFENCE 1.1427 0.1409 8.1104 0.4272 METAL AND GLASS CONF. 0.7951 0.1152 6.9041 0.3520
PAPER CONFECT 1.1114 0.1330 8.3577 0.4385 BREWERS AND ALCOOL 0.8270 0.1079 7.6675 0.4022
ENTERTAINMENT 1.0459 0.1374 7.6098 0.3986 SOFT DRINKS NON ALC. 0.9021 0.1018 8.8643 0.4739
ALLUMINIUM 0.8348 0.1530 5.4556 0.2512 ELECRICAL EQUIPMENT 1.0308 0.0757 13.6087 0.6817
TOBACCO 0.9943 0.1410 7.0496 0.3600 COMPOSIT OIL 0.6380 0.0978 6.5240 0.3212
RETAIL COMP. 1.0268 0.1312 7.8240 0.4121 ELECTRIC POWER COMP. 0.5052 0.0971 5.2054 0.2314
PUBLISHING NEWSP. 1.2119 0.1076 11.2636 0.5942 SP500
RESTAURANTS 1.0648 0.1130 9.4216 0.5052 PUBLIC UTILITIES 0.6151 0.0786 7.8282 0.4083
Note: Industries are presented according to the variability ordering of table 1VI.  Firm level results  
We now check if the hypothesis of a link between idiosyncratic risk (i.e. volatility) and 
innovative activity can be better sustained with firm level data.    
We employ monthly observations of individual stock returns for a selection of 34 firms 
belonging to 5 industries with different levels of “innovativeness” (agriculture, 
biotechnologies, computers, pharmaceuticals and textiles).  According to (average) R&D 
intensity data, the order of innovativeness from most to least is: biotechnology, computers, 
pharmaceutical, textiles, agriculture.  This order is confirmed in the taxonomy found in the 
appendix.    
The number of selected firms per industry was chosen according to the need of having 
continuous price and dividends information for an adequate time span.  By adequate we 
mean both one guaranteeing a satisfactory and up to date number of observations for the 
implementation of our analysis, and the one allowing the number of firms in each industry to 
be greater than unity.  The chosen period is 1981m1 2003m7.  
The approach is substantially analogous to the one employed at the industry level, but 
the CAPM model analysis is also extended to the explicit consideration of time varying 
volatility.  In fact, the availability of observations at higher frequency (monthly series) allows 
the implementation of the CAPM analysis in the context of the GARCH approach to the direct 
representation of the series volatility.   
VI.a. Descriptive analysis at the firm level   
The descriptive analysis is conducted via the same methodologies and aims described 
in the industry level analysis. Thus, the considerations expressed there remain valid. Table 6 
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Descriptive statistics for the firm level monthly series 
SF i r m  Mean  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. rel weight R&D/Sales
A ADM 0.010 0.275 -0.274 0.080 0.919 0.001
A ALCO 0.007 0.620 -0.341 0.085 0.054 NA
A ZAP 0.003 1.006 -0.413 0.183 0.027 NA
B DNA 0.023 0.726 -0.296 0.137 0.912 0.428
B ENZ 0.028 1.500 -0.550 0.226 0.067 0.624
B LIPD 0.002 0.756 -0.458 0.137 0.021 NA
C 3CTLE 0.011 1.778 -0.666 0.285 0.002 0.042
C 3SOCR 0.015 1.500 -0.538 0.230 0.000 0.101
C AAPL 0.016 0.454 -0.577 0.152 0.036 0.064
C DBD 0.013 0.420 -0.283 0.091 0.009 0.037
C HPQ 0.014 0.345 -0.320 0.107 0.199 0.084
C IBM 0.010 0.354 -0.275 0.084 0.633 0.066
C NIPNY 0.010 0.483 -0.347 0.116 0.120 0.160
P 3OXIS01 0.014 2.643 -0.670 0.294 0.000 0.624
P ABT 0.014 0.221 -0.207 0.066 0.087 0.090
P BMY 0.010 0.222 -0.282 0.067 0.112 0.088
P FRX 0.025 0.525 -0.382 0.112 0.005 0.087
P GSK 0.018 0.276 -0.316 0.078 0.108 0.103
P JNJ 0.014 0.183 -0.173 0.068 0.132 0.084
P KV 0.034 1.156 -0.506 0.189 0.000 0.081
P LLY 0.014 0.308 -0.295 0.081 0.087 0.144
P MRK 0.014 0.222 -0.219 0.071 0.162 0.092
P PFE 0.016 0.259 -0.240 0.074 0.117 0.113
P PHA 0.009 0.326 -1.000 0.098 0.047 0.103
P SGP 0.012 0.203 -0.199 0.074 0.049 0.112
P WYE 0.012 0.259 -0.261 0.071 0.094 0.079
T 3BMLS 0.047 6.000 -0.886 0.453 0.008 NA
T 3CRWS 0.032 4.360 -0.718 0.330 0.047 0.016
T BOTX 0.018 3.167 -0.667 0.284 0.012 0.001
T FIT 0.008 0.430 -0.564 0.084 0.139 0.022
T HWG 0.007 0.755 -0.672 0.157 0.060 NA
T UFI 0.016 0.506 -0.306 0.125 0.537 0.010
T VELCF 0.013 0.381 -0.210 0.084 0.197 NA
. SP500 0.009 0.131 -0.217 0.045 . NA
 
The descriptive statistics present some surprising results: the higher unconditional 
sample variability is found for the first three firms of the textiles industry and the lower 
unconditional sample variability for some firms of the pharmaceuticals group. This result is 
not particularly meaningful at the individual firm level, because volatility may well be induced 
by idiosyncratic risk factors (or firm specific events) other than those regarding innovation.  In 
order to obtain a more general result, average industry specific figures are calculated by 
weighting the firm level returns by their relative capitalizations in the time span considered. 
We assume that the total capitalization of the single industries is the one obtained by 
summing the capitalization of the firms considered in the analysis. This is the same as 
assuming we hold a  portfolio in which equal shares of the different assets are enclosed.  
  18The effect of firm size on volatility appears clearly if we confront the average relative 
weight of the single firms in the time span considered with the relative standard deviations.  
From Table 6, we observe that volatility is persistently smaller the higher the relative weight 
of the firm.  This is particularly evident for those firms with the highest standard deviation. For 
each industry, the higher volatility is always associated with the smallest firm. Even if 
controlling for the size effect is beyond the potential of this descriptive analysis, it seems 
realistic to advance that some evidence of the supposed relationship between innovative 
activity and volatility can be recuperated once the capitalization factor is included in the 
analysis.  Looking at the last column of Table 6, we can verify the substantial validity of the 
taxonomy found in the appendix for the period considered in the analysis.   
One important aspect of the volatility assessment is its behavior over time. The 
following figures show the standard deviation movements in the sample period 1983-2003 at 
the industry level.  Time varying volatility is obtained by calculating 24 term moving averages 
of the standard deviations.  
Figures 3-7 illustrate that in 3 of the 5 industries (agriculture, pharmaceutical, textile),  
idiosyncratic risk did not change very much over time.   Instead, for biotech and computers, 
idiosyncratic risk was highest precisely in the periods when the case study literature claims 
that there was the most innovation in the industries (see Gambardella 1995 and Bresnahan 
and Greenstein 1997).  We look at this possibility more closely in section VII when we 
regress volatility on R&D intensity data (R&D/sales), and in future work where we plan to 
include patent citation data.  
Figure 3 



































































































  19Figure 4 




































































































































































































































































































  20Figure 7 

































































































VI.b.  Results from the firm level, bivariate VAR representations 
The same approach used for the industry level analysis is now used for the firm level 
analysis. The pitfalls cautioned in the industry level analysis for the appropriateness of the 
use of the Granger Causality (GC) testing approach should be reiterated, even if their 
strength is stronger due to the higher frequency observations. 
The results from GC analysis are quite interesting, for they signal some evidence in 
favor of our expected result of GC (predictive capabilities) from the general market returns to 
the firm level returns for the less innovative firms. The hypothesis is that for low innovative 
firms belonging to mature industries, the news affecting the general market is relevant also at 
the firm level, while high idiosyncratic elements tend to obscure the effects of general 













  21Table 7 
Granger non-causality tests at the firm level 
 
H0: SP500   
does not GC:
H0: SP500   
does not GC:
S Firm F-Statistic Probability Response S Firm F-Statistic Probability Response
A ADM 0.643 0.526 A P GSK 0.951 0.388 A
A ALCO 2.934 0.045 R P JNJ 0.419 0.658 A
A ZAP 5.396 0.005 R P KV 1.418 0.244 A
B DNA 0.642 0.527 A P LLY 2.160 0.117 A
B ENZ 0.353 0.703 A P MRK 1.025 0.360 A
B LIPD 0.303 0.739 A P PFE 0.413 0.662 A
C 3CTLE 2.449 0.088 A P PHA 2.051 0.131 A
C 3SOCR 0.123 0.884 A P SGP 0.033 0.967 A
C AAPL 3.327 0.037 R P WYE 0.434 0.649 A
C DBD 1.143 0.321 A T 3BMLS 2.271 0.105 A
C HPQ 0.905 0.406 A T 3CRWS 1.450 0.236 A
C IBM 1.895 0.152 A T 3GMIL 2.615 0.075 A
C NIPNY 0.331 0.719 A T BOTX 3.447 0.033 R
P 3OXIS 1.163 0.314 A T FIT 1.091 0.337 A
P ABT 0.178 0.837 A T HWG 1.967 0.142 A
P BMY 0.547 0.579 A T UFI 3.243 0.041 R
P FRX 1.853 0.159 A T VELCF 8.044 0.000 R
Note: A = hypothesis accepted; R = hypothesis rejected 
Note B: Underlying VAR orders are selected via the SBC Information Criterion.    
 
 
With the exception of Apple (AAPL), all the firms for which the NGC hypothesis is 
rejected belong to the agriculture and textile industries, thus to the low innovative industries 
in the sample.  However, the fact that confirmation of NGC is found both for the innovative 
firms and for some low innovative firms renders the evidence, again, rather mixed. 
 
Using variance decomposition analysis we find that akin to the outcomes obtained at 
the industry level, the forecast variance at a 1-quarter horizon appears dominated almost 
entirely by idiosyncratic variability.  This is common to all the firms considered in the analysis 
and is persistent even during a 6 month horizon. Evidence of slight decay is observable for 
some of the textile firms and, against our expectations, for a biotechnology firm (ENZO).  
Table 8 below presents the forecast variance results up to the 6







  22Table 8 
Forecast variance decomposition at the firm level 
SF i r m 123456 SF i r m 123456
A ADM 99.981 99.881 97.457 96.596 96.589 96.577 P GSK 99.394 98.463 98.461 98.378 97.074 94.133
A ALCO 99.976 99.126 99.125 98.741 98.728 98.724 P JNJ 98.690 98.234 96.984 97.016 96.612 96.604
A ZAP 99.540 99.362 99.230 99.236 99.227 99.001 P KV 99.995 97.828 97.562 97.576 96.827 92.971
B DNA 99.859 99.723 99.721 98.422 98.328 98.155 P LLY 99.530 99.530 99.390 98.332 98.220 97.960
B ENZ 98.843 98.811 89.537 89.286 89.251 88.850 P MRK 99.523 99.519 97.857 97.729 97.000 96.996
B LIPD 99.659 99.151 99.116 98.779 97.971 97.804 P PFE 99.309 98.450 97.166 96.684 95.085 94.534
C 3CTLE 99.720 99.718 99.718 99.484 99.326 99.246 P PHA 99.996 99.929 99.929 98.477 96.665 96.503
C 3SOCR 99.214 98.779 98.635 97.811 96.739 94.700 P SGP 99.027 98.949 98.950 98.897 98.888 98.888
C AAPL 99.764 99.656 99.656 99.544 99.498 98.848 P WYE 98.933 98.930 98.259 98.071 98.013 95.858
C DBD 100.000 99.245 99.061 96.944 96.104 91.584 T 3BMLS 99.995 99.900 98.628 98.622 98.489 98.174
C HPQ 99.990 99.681 99.603 99.427 99.399 99.392 T 3CRWS 99.850 99.468 99.144 93.582 90.658 90.685
C IBM 99.473 96.921 96.947 96.981 96.839 95.558 T 3GMIL 82.933 82.971 82.961 82.982 82.990 83.055
C NIPNY 99.103 96.776 96.790 96.789 96.590 96.585 T BOTX 99.999 99.997 99.808 99.806 99.794 99.510
P 3OXIS 99.928 99.067 98.840 98.096 97.103 97.078 T FIT 99.246 98.146 98.129 96.352 96.254 95.258
P ABT 99.852 99.822 99.799 99.751 97.677 96.438 T HWG 99.947 99.584 99.570 99.469 99.248 98.391
P BMY 98.776 98.735 98.445 98.402 98.306 98.115 T UFI 99.568 97.797 97.277 95.109 92.751 92.406
P FRX 99.304 98.805 98.486 98.279 98.275 97.139 T VELCF 97.485 97.508 96.297 95.918 95.991 95.984
forecast period forecast period
Note: Underlying VAR orders are selected via the SBC Information Criterion. 
The overall results from the analyses using the bivariate VAR representation are thus 
weakly informative. Even if some favorable signals are present, they do not provide strong 
evidence for our hypothesis.    
The idiosyncratic elements at work when confining the analysis to the firm level are 
presumably manifold. Hence, the indirect identification of a clear relationship between 
volatility and innovativeness is not easily practicable. In Section VII we will see that a more 
direct identification using R&D data produces better results.  
VI.c. Firm level analysis continued: ARCH and GARCH components in the volatility 
measure (in CAPM model) 
We now approach the question of excess returns and volatility using a CAPM excess 
returns representation, allowing for a direct formulation and estimation of the variance 
equation in the context of the ARCH methodology (Engle, 1982, Bollersev, 1986).  Before 
presenting the results, a brief section is dedicated to a quick stylized introduction to the 
generalized ARCH (GARCH) specification chosen and to the assumptions that we employ in 
the applications. The connections between this tool for studying time varying volatility and 
our particular objectives are made explicit. 
VI.c(1). G/ ARCH-in-Mean and asymmetric volatility modeling 
We employ as a general starting point the Threshold ARCH-in-mean GARCH-in-
volatility formulation of order (p, q):  
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where   is the firm-level stock rate of return,   is the general market rate of return (hence,  t y t x
β  is the generalisation of the CAPM to the G/ARCH formulation), and λ  is a coefficient 
linking returns to volatility
11. The term   in the variance equation is the ARCH term 
(equivalent to a MA term) and   its generalization to lagged variance (often defined 
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1 - t 1 - t γε ψ  controls for asymmetric effects, in fact  0 , 1 = t ψ  is a 
wildcard operating according to the thresholds  0 , 0 ≥ < t t ε ε  respectively
12. The system (3)-
(4) is a highly general mean-variance formulation, since it can account for a number of 
specificities in the data.  
The conditional variance formulation implies that, the bigger the departure from the 
equilibrium in the mean equation, the larger the conditional variance (one-period ahead 
forecast variance based on past information). The error terms, or news terms, are in fact 
excess returns.  
Bigger values for the ARCH coefficient produce a greater forecast variance. The ARCH 
coefficient expresses the conditional variance sensitivity to shocks in the mean equation, 
while the GARCH, or autoregressive term, is the degree of memory in the variance 
generating process. The higher the autoregressive coefficient, the smoother the variance 
behavior
13.  
The consideration of possible asymmetries in the variance response expressed by the 
threshold term is due to the fact that the volatility response to shocking news from the mean 
equation (the MA term) may be asymmetric, possibly with stronger reactions to negative 
shocks (Engle and Ng, 1993)
14. 
                                                 
11 Under the assumption of risk-adverse individuals, it is possible to advance the hypothesis of a direct 
relationship between expected returns and expected volatility. The economic rationale is that agents accept 
higher risks only in the view of higher profits. The generalisation of this idea to the G/ARCH approach 
produces the G/ARCH-M specification (Engle, Lilien and Robbins, 1987). 
 
12 Jointly with the mean equation in (2), this formulation is known as the Threshold GARCH model (Zakoian, 
1990). 
 
13 For this reason, in the finance econometric literature the GARCH parameter is often considered as a 
“defensiveness” measure for it determines the degree of resistance the conditional variance opposes to 
“shocking news” affecting the mean equation. 
 
14 The general case is the one of positive values accounting for the presence of the leverage effects. 
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idiosyncratic risk (or news on it), in turn produced, among other factors, by the uncertainty 
produced by the innovative activity of firms.  
Other things equal, the conditional volatility is thus expected to be bigger in those firms 
displaying higher innovative efforts. This outcome can be assessed via the estimation of the 
theoretical parameters in the formulation above. We expect to find higher and meaningful 
coefficients for the MA term values of the highly innovative firms and bigger defensiveness 
(coefficients on the AR term) for the low innovative.  
VI.c(2). G/ ARCH-in-Mean and asymmetric volatility results 
Considering that innovation brings uncertainty and that risk-adverse individuals may 
adopt different behaviors according to the state of  nature they are confronted with, we also 
expect both the GARCH-in-mean and the threshold asymmetry coefficients to be larger in the 
innovative firms’ equations.  Table 9 presents with the results of the CAPM TGARCH 
estimation. 
Table 9 
CAPM TGARCH estimation results at the firm level 
S Firm lambda Beta ARCH GARCH  gamma S Firm lambda Beta ARCH GARCH gamma
A ADM NM 0.942 0.094 0.767 NM P GSK NM 0.806 0.049 0.898 NM
A ALCO 1.450 0.491 0.094 0.772 NM P JNJ NM 0.841 NM 0.789 0.207
A ZAP NM 0.987 0.197 0.762 NM P KV NM 1.309 0.058 0.933 NM
B DNA NM 1.023 0.067 0.879 0.314 P LLY NM 1.006 0.039 0.953 NM
B ENZ 0.562 1.555 0.110 0.744 0.257 P MRK NM 0.895 0.110 0.847 NM
B LIPD 0.271 0.822 0.337 -0.232 NM P PFE NM 0.907 0.048 0.848 NM
C 3CTLE 0.562 1.031 NM 0.852 0.405 P PHA NM 0.601 NM 0.590 NM
C 3SOCR NM 1.155 -0.027 1.026 0.039 P SGP NM 0.867 0.110 0.864 NM
C AAPL NM 1.443 0.518 NM 0.192 P WYE 0.496 0.817 0.041 0.726 0.188
C DBD NM 0.702 -0.059 0.626 0.150 T 3BMLS 0.799 0.398 0.083 0.265 1.044
C HPQ 5.023 1.459 0.003 0.857 0.053 T 3CRWS NM 0.530 0.434 0.611 NM
C IBM 0.437 0.935 NM 1.000 0.092 T BOTX 0.651 0.872 -0.053 0.891 0.324
C NIPNY NM 0.988 0.208 NM -0.271 T FIT NM 0.595 0.126 0.825 NM
P 3OXIS 0.627 1.687 0.030 0.599 0.688 T HWG NM 0.981 -0.020 1.020 NM
P ABT NM 0.835 0.064 0.894 NM T UFI NM 0.847 -0.050 1.003 0.071
P BMY NM 0.820 0.181 0.680 0.224 T VELCF NM 0.475 0.219 NM 0.341
P FRX NM 0.987 0.039 0.929 NM
mean equation variance equation mean equation variance equation
Note: ARCH =  ; GARCH =∑ .  ∑ =
p
1 i i δ
=
q
1 i i φ
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
 
  25The estimation is effectuated starting with a (1,1) lag order formulation, then increasing 
the order until the condition of finding no ARCH components in disturbances is satisfied. A 
unit lag structure has resolved satisfying for most of the series, with only few needing a 
higher order structure.  
Firms in the agriculture industry do not show meaningful asymmetries in the volatility 
behaviors. Important asymmetric responses are instead found for most of the biotechnology 
and computer firms, particularly for those with the smaller dimensions or the higher 
innovative activity (compare Table 6 with Table 9). The asymmetry parameter resulted 
meaningful also for some firms in the textile and pharmaceutical industry. We do not find a 
clear correspondence between volatility and innovativeness or volatility and firm size except 
for some of the very innovative and very un-innovative firms (e.g. 3OXIS for pharmaceuticals 
and 3BMLS and BOTX for textiles).   
Although the mean/variance relationship is not industry specific, it is found meaningful 
in particular for the smallest firms in each industry (ALCO in agriculture,  ENZ, LIPD in 
biotechnology, 3CTLE in computers, 3OXIS in pharmaceuticals, and 3BMLS and BOTX in 
textiles). In the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries, these firms are also the most 
innovative. 
The ARCH (responsiveness) parameter is particularly high in the computer and 
biotechnology industries (the ARCH component should be evaluated contextually with its 
asymmetric component).  This is consistent with the results that emerge from the ‘asymmetry 
response’ analysis.  
The GARCH (variance memory) component tends to be smaller for the firms that have 
a larger responsiveness to volatility as expressed by the ARCH coefficient.  This is what we 
expected to find, given that GARCH signals for variance smoothness.  However, even if the 
TGARCH analysis produces interpretable results, the mixed evidence prevents us from 
obtaining clear results.  A necessary step is to give importance to firm dimension. To do this, 
we run the same TGARCH estimations now allowing for the presence of a dimensionality 
measure in the variance equation.     
The standard formulation employed (for each firm independently) is: 
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  26where Rkt is a dimensionality measure, i.e. the ratio of the individual firm capital to industry 
capitalization. Hence θ  is expected to be meaningful and negative, especially for those firms 
denoting high capitalization movements in the sample period considered. Results are 
presented in Table 10. 
Table 10 
CAPM TGARCH estimation results at the firm level: dimensionality in variance equation 
S Firm lambda Beta ARCH GARCH  gamma S Firm lambda Beta ARCH GARCH gamma
A ADM NM 0.936 NM 0.781 NM P GSK NM 0.720 0.277 NM -0.267
A ALCO NM 0.427 NM 0.916 NM P JNJ NM 0.853 0.11231 0.776 NM
A ZAP 2.158 1.194 NM 0.359 NM P KV NM 1.233 -0.099 1.010 0.078
B DNA NM 1.033 0.062 0.887 0.314 P LLY NM 1.017 0.086 0.906 NM
B ENZ 1.263 1.417 0.193 0.400 0.071 P MRK NM 0.897 0.131 0.848 NM
B LIPD 1.276 0.815 0.300 -0.314 NM P PFE NM 0.930 0.146 -0.586 NM
C 3CTLE NM 0.944 0.124 0.521 NM P PHA NM 0.737 NM 0.573 NM
C 3SOCR MN 1.171 -0.020 1.007 0.095 P SGP -0.466 0.858 0.043 0.936 NM
C AAPL 0.746 1.413 0.079 0.815 NM P WYE 5.188 0.763 -0.056 0.736 0.264
C DBD NM 0.747 NM NM NM T 3BMLS 0.951 0.426 NM 0.337 0.944
C HPQ 1.997 1.083 0.049 0.857 0.200 T 3CRWS NM 1.231 NM -0.181 1.389
C IBM NM 0.969 -0.064 0.526 0.275 T BOTX 0.565 0.944 NM 0.914 0.313
C NIPNY 3.829 0.910 0.054 0.875 NM T FIT NM 0.583 NM 0.558 NM
P 3OXIS NM 1.579 0.049 0.633 1.085 T HWG NM 1.150 NM 0.601 NM
P ABT NM 0.820 0.019 1.000 NM T UFI NM 0.690 NM 0.695 NM
P BMY NM 0.849 0.101 0.811 NM T VELCF NM 0.451 NM 0.516 NM
P FRX NM 0.958 NM 0.928 NM
mean equation variance equation mean equation variance equation
 
The introduction of the dimensionality measure in the variance equation produces 
encouraging results. The ARCH component is meaningless for all the TGARCH of the firms 
belonging to agriculture and textiles while meaningful results, with the exception of DBD 
(computers), FRX and PHA (pharmaceuticals), are found for all the firms belonging to the 
more innovative industries. Furthermore, for DBD a TGARCH volatility model doesn’t seem 
to be a good approximation at all. MA components are often reinforced by asymmetry 
components, even if they do not appear as industry specific as the ARCH ones. No 
asymmetry is found for the agricultural industry. Also, no industry specificities are found for 
the mean variance relationships.  
In summary, the hypothesis of a relationship between innovativeness and volatility 
seems to be favored by the data. The fact that in this section we did not here work with direct 
observations on innovation (e.g. R&D, patents) and the fact we had to reduce the analysis to 
a smaller set of firms makes the figures highly exposed to specificities other than those 
related to innovative capacity. Nonetheless, when controlling for dimensionality, the 
TGARCH analysis seems able to detect the presence of symptoms of excess volatility for the 
most innovative firms considered in the analysis.  We now consider innovation more directly.  
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  In sections V and VI innovation was introduced via a sectoral categorization of innovation 
found in the appendix, inspired by the work of Pavitt (1984).  Given the importance in both the 
industry and firm level analysis of time varying volatility (see Sections Va, Vb, VIa), what is 
necessary is to gain more insight into the determinants of this variation.  We do so here by 
introducing a limited proxy for innovation, R&D intensity (R&D/sales).  It is a limited proxy due to 
the fact that R&D represents only the input to innovation.  A better measure would be patent data 
as this is a good proxy for innovative output.  However, we leave this to our future work (where we 
connect NBER patent data with volatility data).    
Using annual firm-level R&D intensity data, we evaluate whether these can explain observed 
changes in firm level volatility of stock returns. Employing monthly observations on stock returns, 
the annual volatility figures are calculated as 12 term (monthly returns) standard deviations. Given 
the small time dimension of the sample obtained, the preferred estimators are the pooled OLS and 
GLS, both with the common constant (C) and Fixed Effects (FE) versions. In order to control, as in 
the previous analysis, for the effects of dimensionality on volatility, the firms’ relative capitalization 
weights are also entered in the different specifications. The idiosyncratic elements can thus be 
captured by the GLS weighting, the FE specification and the relative weights in capitalization. The 
best results are obtained when the R&D intensity measure is entered with 5-year lags. Since R&D 
is an innovation input rather than output, the high order is not theoretically problematic.  It is also 
consistent with other studies studying the relationship between R&D and performance. Table 11 
below shows the results of the analysis under different specifications.    
Table 11 
Panel estimation of the relationship between volatility and innovative effort 
Method Dim. corr. int coeff t-stat dim coeff t-stat r&d coeff (-5) t-stat Rbar sq
Pooled OLS n 0.106 23.586 - - 0.056 5.098 0.055
GLS n 0.086 34.856 - - 0.048 3.032 0.143
FE Pooled OLS n CS spec - - - 0.023 2.354 0.399
FE GLS n CS spec - - - 0.017 0.907 0.395
Pooled OLS y 0.116 22.672 -0.061 -3.897 0.056 5.264 0.085
GLS y 0.091 29.611 -0.015 -2.187 0.049 3.130 0.167
FE Pooled OLS y CS spec - -0.090 -1.007 0.023 2.351 0.399
FE GLS y CS spec - -0.065 -1.659 0.018 0.957 0.401
Pooled OLS y CS spec 0.205 19.351 CS spec - 0.038 3.689 0.311
GLS y CS spec 0.124 16.181 CS spec - 0.037 2.207 0.291
  
Note: CS spec = Cross Section specific  
The hypothesis of a positive relationship between volatility and R&D intensity is not rejected 
by the data. The innovation effect is statistically meaningful.  It is interesting to note that the 
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controlling for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity via GLS and for Fixed Effects makes the R&D 
intensity coefficient statistically meaningless. This potentially happens because the covariation 
between R&D intensity and volatility may be captured by the two sectional corrections (FE and 
GLS). The same occurs to the coefficient on the weight for capitalization, resulting statistically 
meaningless only when entered in a FE-GLS specification. The possibility that the joint 
consideration of both the corrections for the sectional specificities is responsible for this result is 
also signaled by the fact that the percentage of variance explained by the regression does not 
improve when moving from a FE OLS to a FE GLS, while the GLS correction resulted highly 
effective when the a common constant restriction was imposed. These results are encouraging and 
suggest that a more direct consideration of innovation activity, for example using patent data, may 
improve the results.   
VIII. Conclusion   
The paper has found that results concerning the relationship between innovativeness 
and stock return volatility is rather mixed.  In line with the findings found in Campbell et al. 
(2000), results using industry level data find no coherent pattern between innovation and 
idiosyncratic risk.  While some of the innovative industries conform to the predicted behavior 
of higher idiosyncratic risk (e.g. semiconductors), other innovative ones do not (e.g. aircraft).  
The same holds for the low innovative industries.  In fact, our expectations seem to be only 
fulfilled in the extremes of the categorization. 
As in Campbell et al, more clear results concerning idiosyncratic risk emerge using firm level 
data.  Here, we find that firms in the most innovative industries (e.g. biotech, computers) clearly 
have the highest idiosyncratic risk.  Furthermore, a look at how volatility changes over time, shows 
that in fact idiosyncratic risk is highest precisely during those decades when innovation is the most 
radical: computers (1989-1997) and biotechnology (1995-2003).  In particular, results are strongest 
when firm dimension is included, and when time varying volatility is explicitly accounted for using 
GARCH analysis.  
Results are particularly encouraging when innovation is introduced directly, as opposed 
to indirectly via the categorization in the appendix.  Idiosyncratic risk is clearly the highest for 
those firms that have the highest R&D intensity.  Given this encouraging result, and given 
that it is important to also take into consideration innovative output, our future work will focus 
on this area of analysis (e.g. incorporating patent data into the volatility analysis).   
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  32APPENDIX 
 
Intensity of R&D expenditure by sector: time average 1980-1992          Level of technological opportunity by industry in the worlds largest firm
INDUSTRY R&D Product group Factor Rank Rank Rank %
HIGH Aerospace 18.9 R&D int. patent int. FG pat.
Computers 15.5 HIGH Instruments (photo&) 2.2 412
Pharmaceuticals 11.3 Computers 1.72 251
Electronics and telecoms 10.8 Pharmaceuticals 1.29 135
Other transport 8.1 Electrical-electronics 1.19 323
Instruments 7.2
MED-HIGH Chemicals 0.25 747
MED-HIGH Motor vehicles 4.4 Motor vehicles 0.18 61 0 4
Chemicals 2.8 Aircraft -0.04 57 1 2
Electrical Machinery 2.7
MEDIUM Rubber -0.4 89 1 0
MEDIUM Non-electrical machinery 1.7 Textiles -0.4 10 11 6
Other manufacturing 1.3 Machinery -0.44 96 1 5
Petroleum 1.3
Building materials 1.2 MED-LOW Building materials -0.56 11 8 13
Rubber and plastics 1.2 Paper and wood -0.67 15 15 8
Non-ferrous metals 0.8 Drink and tobacco -0.81 17 16 9
Metal products 0.6 Other transport -0.85 12 12 16
Ferrous metals 0.5 Food -0.87 14 17 11
Mining and petroleum -0.87 16 13 14
MED-LOW Paper and printing 0.3 Metals -0.92 13 14 17
Food and Tobacco 0.3
Wood and wood products 0.2 Source: Marsili (2001), Table 6.7
Textiles 0.2
TOTAL MANUFACTURING  3.1
source: Marsili (2001), Table 6.2  
 
 